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Articles
Podberesky, Hopwood, and Adarand: Implications for the Future
of Race-Based Programs
Lino A. Graglia .................................. 287
Three recent decisions requiring strict scrutiny of race-based programs put the future

of racially preferential "affirmative action" programs in doubt. In Podberesky, the

Fourth Circuit disallowed race-based scholarship programs. In Hopwood, the Fifth
Circuit rejected diversity and held that remedying past discrimination (narrowly
defined) was the sole justification for race-based admissions. In Adarand, the
Supreme Court required strict scrutiny of federal as well as state race-based
programs.

The Unconventional Equal Protection Jurisprudence of Jury Selection
Joel H. Swift .................................... 295
This article traces the development of equal protectionjurisprudence as it has been
applied to one aspect of the criminal justice system, to wit, selection of juries. It
demonstrates that the United States Supreme Court's approach has been inconsistent
with conventional equal protection doctrine in two ways. Unlike conventional
doctrine, which requiresproofof subjective intent to discriminateto make out a prima
facie case, the Court has found that the mere use of a jury selection process that has
a proven statisticallydisparate negative impact on the selection of African-American
jurors is sufficient to establish a primafacie violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
The articlefirtherdemonstrates thatconventional "level of review" doctrine,including
the requirementthat govermnent action may never be arbitrary,does not apply tojury
selection, and has held that individuals other than those in protected groups may be
renoved from a jury without any rationalbasis for the decision.

Religious Tolerance and its Limits in Early America
George Dargo ..................................

This article posits that religious toleration in early America was rooted in practical
considerations amid the necessities of settlement. The British colonies in North
America achievedan unparalleleddegree of religiousliberty. Even groups that were
on the social margins of American life--e.g., Roman Catholics, Jews, African
Americans--gained a measure of social recognition and religious toleration because
they found a role or served certain necessary functions in a developing society.
Native Americans were not similarlytreated because they were never able to establish
equivalentfunctional utility. Philosophical advocates of Religious Toleration and
Freedom of Conscience--principally Roger Williams and John Locke--envisaged a
regime of religious liberty that specifically included America's native peoples. But
because religious toleration developed out of necessity rather than out of profound
philosophical or ideological commitment, Colonial Amnerica did not achieve the
standardor religious liberty that Williams and Locke would have appliedparticularly
as this concernedNative Americans. Despite a growing scholarly literatureon Native
American history and culture, anmd, in particular,the increasing appreciation of the
Native American spiritual legacy, native peoples continue to suffer the consequences
of a continuing bias on issues of religiousfreedom. This bias is rooted in America's
earliesthistorical experience.
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The Special Senate Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce
began its work on May 10, 1950 and concluded with the submission of its final report
on May 1, 1951. The finction of the Committee was tofidly study the extent to which
organized crime makes use of the facilities of interstate commerce. Following
hearings held in 14 cities and testimony from more than 600 witnesses, the Committee
concluded that a sinister conspiracy offoreign origin controls organized crime. The
Committee's hearings were the first CongressionalCommittee hearings televised live
to a national audience. This Article examines the influence of nativism in the
Committee's investigation, conclusions and recommendations. The Article starts by
examining nativism as a sociological concept by tracing its notable historical
significance in Amnerican culture. It then explores nativism as informing competing
theories of organized crime aiding and abetting an acceptance of aforeign conspiracy
model over a model emphasizing organized crime as a homegrown response to
indigenous social and economic conditions. Lastly, the Article examines the influence
of nativismn in the Committee's investigative hearings, in their recommendations and
in their use of television to incite nativist urges and spread nativist sentiment.

In the 1936 case of United States v. Curtiss- Wright Export Corporation, the Supreme
Court upheld an arms embargo imposed by Franklin Roosevelt upon the warring
factions in the Chaco conflict. Although Congress authorized the embargo, the Court
chose to rely on "the exclusive power of the president to act as sole organ of the
federal government its the field of international relations." In the ensuing fifty years,
commentators have consistently criticized Curtiss- Wright; in contrast, members of the
Supreme Court have regularly looked to Curtiss- Wright as guiding precedent. This
article examines the manner in which the Court has used Curtiss-Wright to sanction
a pre-eminent president in the field of national security affairs. For decades, the
Court relied upon the "sole organ" language of Curtiss- Wright to justify its view of
a presidency which fr-equently transcended the separation of powers. Even in the
wake of Vietnam, Watergate, and the congressional resurgence of the 1970s, the Court
has looked to Curtiss- Wright to uphold bold and sometimes imaginative
interpretations of the law which allowed the president's policy preferences to
ultinately prevail.

In his article, the author argues that current industry practices and consuner
expectations justify the expansion of the duties owed by insurance producers to their
clients. Specifically, he proposes that courts should become more vigilant in holding
producers accountablefor failing to inquire broadly into the consumer's insurance
needs and for failing to properly advise the consumner regardimg pertinent coverage
areas.

This article examines a lile of precedent which has utilized the Frye standard to
exclude forensic DNA evidence. An analysis of these cases provides support for the
criticism that the Frye standard is subject to manipulation by those seeking to exclude
evidence. Examining the scientific debate concernimig the statistical iterpretation of
DNA evidence reveals that the Fye standard is a poor conceptual framework to
evaluate an emergimg forensic technique. The ambiguities of Frye allow the
presentation of scientific controversy, which is imherent ii any scientific advance, as
constituting a lack of general acceptance. Furthermore, the adversarial nature of the
Frye inquiry distorts the views of the scientific community.

Comments
The "Impartial" Jury and Media Overload: Rethinking Attorney
Speech Regulations in the 1990s
Katrina M. Kelly ................................ 483
As a growing number of attorneys seek and receive more media attention during
trials, the days in which jurors judge a case's merits based solely on what they have
heard in the courtroom are quickly fading. The author discusses the present state of
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.6, which regulates attorney speech, and
examines the difficulties courts have faced in applying the provision. The solution to
the attorney speech problem likely lies in a revised standard in which jurors are not
required to completely leave their personal beliefs outside the jury room.

The Future of the Exclusionary Rule: An Alternative Analysis
for the Adjudication of Individual Rights
Benjamin A. Swift ............................... 507
The benefits accrued through the use of computer and technological advances
unfortunately sometimes infringe upon personal liberties. This comment examines the
range and scope of the Exclusionary Rule in those instances when computer or
technological errors supply improper evidence about individuals to police. The author
focuses on the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Evans, and then places
Evans in its context in criminal procedure jurisprudence.

Casenotes
Born to Lose: The Illinois "Baby Richard" Case--How
Examining His Father's Pre-Birth Conduct Might Have Led
to a Different Ending for Richard
Gerald W. Huston ............................... 543
This casenote examines the factual and legal circumstances surrounding the
controversial "Baby Richard" case--a case in which the courts applied a "best
interests" test, and in so doing, removed a child from the home of his adoptive parents
to return the child to his birth parents. By drawing comparisons to practices in other
jurisdictions, the author concludes that a thorough examination of the birth father's
pre-birth conduct likely would have changed the court's decision.

